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A CATALYST FOR REFORMING SELFTRANSFER IN MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION: LEXECON, INC. V. MILBERG
WEISS
INTRODUCTION

Discovery demands in massive, multidistrict litigation
("M.D.L.'1 can place tremendous burdens on the federal court
system. Congress enacted a specific M.D.L. statute, 28 U.S.C
§ 1407 ("§ 1407"), to reduce the burden of discovery demands by
providing for temporary transfer of civil actions from multiple
districts to a single district for consolidated pretrial proceedings.
Section 1407 provides for temporary transfer when civil actions
involve common issues of fact, transfer is for the convenience of
the parties, and transfer will promote judicial efficiency.'
District court judges to whom such cases were transferred
("transferee judges") expanded the scope of the M.D.L. statute by
invoking the change of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
("§ 1404(a)"), to transfer cases to themselves for trial after those
cases had been consolidated for pretrial proceedings.4 This
judicial practice, known as "self-transfer" or "self-assignment,"
violated the plain language of the M.D.L. statute,5 which
' See Patricia D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 124 F.R.D. 479,
481 (1989) ("Multidistrict litigation simply means related actions pending in more
than one district.").
2 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 2 (1968), reprinted
in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1899. During the 1960s, federal district courts were swamped with electrical
equipment antitrust cases. The pretrial demands of more than 1,800 separate civil
actions filed in 33 districts threatened to impede the ability of the federal courts to
function. See Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation: Time for Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713 (1991).
'See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1994); see also Desmond T. Barry, Jr., A Practical
Guide to the Ins and Outs of Multidistrict Litigation, 64 DEF. CoUNS. J. 58, 59
(1997).

See infra notes 13-17, 49-70 and accompanying text.
'See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,
959 (1998) (concluding that the M.D.L. statute bars self-transfer), rev'g 102 F.3d
1524 (9th Cir. 1996).
4
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provides that all cases "shall be remanded" at the conclusion of
pretrial proceedings.6
Congress enacted § 1407 upon the recommendation of the
Judicial Conference ("Conference").7 The statute was prompted
by a concern that pretrial discovery demands in massive
litigation would engulf the federal courts!

In proposing the

M.D.L. statute, the Conference balanced the need for efficient
judicial administration with the desire to preserve the parties'
original choice of forum.9 The drafters sought to streamline
judicial administration by providing for consolidated pretrial

proceedings,
discovery. 0

thus

avoiding

conflicting

and

duplicative

In deference to the parties' forum choice, the

6 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
7 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130 at 2, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1899. The

bill enacted as 28 U.S.C. § 1407 was recommended by the Committee on the
Judiciary in the 90th Congress and passed without amendment. See id. at 1,
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1898. A predecessor to the bill was introduced
upon the request of the Judicial Conference of the United States and was the
subject of hearings in the second session of the 89th Congress. See id. The stated
purpose of the legislation was "to provide judicial machinery to transfer, for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, civil actions, having one or more
common questions of fact, pending in different judicial districts." Id.
8 See id. at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1899. The need for statutory
authority to consolidate multidistrict litigation was demonstrated by filings of
multiple civil actions against manufacturers of electrical equipment, after the
government successfully prosecuted the manufacturers for antitrust law violations.
See id; see also DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 2.1 (1986); William W.
Schwarzer, et al., Judicial Federalism: A Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict
Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale Litigation
Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1529, 1531 (1995) ("[Hluge
multi-party, multiforum disputes have become a recurring feature of modern
litigation.") (quoting AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT 7, 12
(1994)).
9 See H.R. REP. NO 90-1130 at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1899. The
stated objective of § 1407 was "to provide centralized management under court
supervision of pretrial proceedings of multidistrict litigation to assure the just and
efficient conduct' of such actions." Id. The drafters determined that this objective
could be achieved by limited transfers. See id. "The proposed statute affects only the
pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any
case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes." Id. at 3,
reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1900.
10 See id. at 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1899-1900; see also Barry,
supra note 3, at 59 (noting that, in addition to preventing duplicative discovery, the
object of a transfer is to "avoid conflicting rulings and schedules, reduce litigation
cost, and save time and effort on the part of the parties"); Wilson W. Herndon &
Ernest R. Higginbotham, Complex Multidistrict Litigation-An Overview of 28
U.S.C. § 1407, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 33, 45 (1979) (listing six factors that the Judicial
Panel uses to determine if a transfer would promote efficiency).
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lawmakers required remand at or before the completion of
pretrial proceedings, thereby preserving the parties' right to
conduct a trial in the district where the litigation originated. 1 In
addition to these transfer and remand provisions, § 1407 created
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("J.P.M.L."), a

panel exclusively empowered to authorize transfers pursuant to
§ 1407(a), remand transferred cases to the originating districts,
and prescribe rules for conducting its business.'
Shortly after Congress enacted § 1407, transferee judges
decided the statute did not go far enough toward achieving
judicial efficiency. 3 Because § 1407(a) orders all cases shall be
remanded "at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings,"4 the judicial efficiency benefits could not be as
fully realized as they could under a system that permitted
consolidation
for pretrial proceedings
and for trial. 5

Consequently, transferee judges innovated the practice of selftransfer whereby, pursuant to change of venue statute
§ 1404(a), 6 judges transferred cases to themselves for trial,
" See H.R.

REPORT.

No. 90-1130, at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A-N., at 1901

(proposing remand to court of original jurisdiction following coordinated pretrial
proceedings); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) ("Each action so transferred shall be
remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to
the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously
terminated.").
12 See H.R. REPORT. No. 90-1130, at 4-5, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
at
1900-02. Subsection (a) authorizes transfer by the J.P.M.L.; subsection (d) provides
authority for the Chief Justice of the United States to appoint the members of the
J.P.M.L., consisting of seven circuit and district judges; subsection (f)grants the
J.P.M.L. the power "to prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not
inconsistent with acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at
5, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1902; see also HERR, supra note 8,at §§ 3.13.9. 9"
See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,
N.H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F.
Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971) (recognizing that judicial efficiency would be maximized by
a single liability trial of cases consolidated and transferred under § 1407).
Conceding that § 1407(a) did not authorize self-transfer, the judge observed that
solutions to "the problems imposed upon the federal courts by complex and
multidistrict cases" have been "developed by judicial interpretation." Id. at 909; see
also Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d. 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971) (asserting that selftransfer "comport[s] with the esential [sic] purpose of § 1407 to 'promote the just
and efficient conduct of complex multidistrict litigation' ") (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1407(a)).
14 28

U.S.C. § 1407(a).

,6See In re Air Crash Disaster, 342 F. Supp. at 908 (stating that a single
liability trial of consolidated M.D.L. cases would expedite the administration of
justice).
'6 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
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which had been consolidated under § 1407(a) for pretrial
proceedings. 7
The practice of self-transfer gained support despite the fact
The J.P.M.L. exceeded its
that it violated the statute. 8
rulemaking power by incorporating self-transfer into its rules of
procedure in Rule 14(b).' 9 Similarly, district and circuit court
judges

condoned

it, 20

albeit

with

minimal

independent

examination." Although commentators agreed that self-transfer
violated § 1407(a),' many urged Congress to authorize the
The practice of self-transfer developed at the
practice.'
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought.").
17 See Lexecon, Inc., 118 S. Ct. at 961 (explaining that the practice of selftransfer has resulted in multiple trials in transferee districts). See generally 15
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3867 (Supp.
1997) (stating "[slelf-transfer under Section 1404(a) has become a routine aspect of
multidistrict litigation practice").
'a See infra note 23 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Manual for Complex
Litigation §§ 21.61 and 31.133 (3d ed. 1995) (acknowledging that transferee judges
may invoke §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) to consolidate for trial cases transferred under §
1407).
'9 See R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 14(b) ("Each transferred action that has not been
terminated in the transferee district court shall be remanded by the Panel to the
transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the
transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.").
20 See In re Korean Airlines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (D.H. Ginsburg, J., concurring), affd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines,
Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 819-20 (3d
Cir. 1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d. 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Hanover, New Hampshire on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 908
(D.N.H. 1971); In re CBS Color Tube Patent Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1403, 1405
(J.P.M.L. 1972).
21 See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes
& Lerach (In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig.), 102 F.3d 1524, 1541 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
22 See Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass
Tort Litigation, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 779, 804 (1985); Julian 0. von Kalinowski, The Power of a
Transferee Judge to Transfer Liability and Damages Trial, 38 J. AIR. L. & COM.
197, 197 (1972); see also Rex Bossert, M.D.L. 'PowerGrab,' NAT'L L.J. Sept. 1, 1997,
at A20-21 (noting that self-transfer has been called "an outrageous usurpation of
judicial power" and that it has been criticized for "rais[ing] serious questions about
the attorney-client relationship and the effective representation of massive numbers
of clients in far-flung federal districts").
2' See John F. Cooney, Comment, The Experience of Transferee Courts Under the
MultidistrictLitigationAct, 39 U. CHi. L. REV. 588, 611 (1972) (concluding that §
1407 needs to be amended to provide transferee judges with a "coherent and
workable mechanism" within which to consolidate cases for trial in order to achieve
efficient judicial administration in M.D.L.); Note, The Judicial Panel and the
Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1030-31, 1036-39 (1974)
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discretion of transferee judges,2 without careful congressional
formulation regarding the circumstances under which cases
should be consolidated for trial. Since the value of self-transfer
as an administrative tool is evident, it is incumbent upon
Congress to amend § 1407 to permit M.D.L. cases to be
consolidated for trial.
Recently, in Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach ("Lexecon"),' the Supreme Court reversed a Ninth Circuit
decision which had affirmed a transferee judge's power to order
self-transfer and conduct trial in the transferee forum.26 Writing
in dissent for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Alex Kozinski presaged
the Supreme Court's ruling by characterizing self-transfer as "a
remarkable power grab by federal judges," because the practice
exceeded the authority Congress granted to transferee judges.27
Justice David Souter, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court,
held that § 1407(a) "obligates" remand and thus bars self
transfer.'
The Ninth Circuit majority had relied on the
substantial body of case law which consistently recognized selftransfer and the presumptive validity of J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) to
justify its result. 29 Judge Kozinski had decried the case law on
self-transfer as devoid of critical analysis" and discredited
(calling for reform of § 1407 to permit the J.P.M.L. to consolidate cases for trial,
suggesting the drafters overestimated the benefits of local trials when they
restricted the reach of the statute to pretrial proceedings only); Rhodes, supra note
2, at 731 (urging congressional action to adopt the §§ "1407-1404(a) combination"
because § 1407 does not provide for trial in the transferee court, yet trial in the
transferee forum "promotes efficient judicial administration and/or is in the interest
of litigants").
Not all commentators who have noted that self-transfer violates § 1407(a) have
applauded it as a judicial innovation. See Trangsrud, supra note 22, at 804
(concluding that self-transfer is "undesirable as a matter of policy in most mass tort
cases"); von Kalinowski, supra note 22, at 204 (asserting that self-transfer is a quest
toward a "nebulous concept of judicial efficiency" which is neither authorized by
statute nor fair to litigants).
24 See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
25 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
26 Id. at 959.
27 Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig.), 102 F.3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the language itself [of § 1407] is clear
as sunlight"), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
28 See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962.
29 See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1532 (Sneed, J.).
30 See id. at 1541 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that following Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-5 (2d Cir. 1971) district and circuit courts had not given
serious consideration as to whether self-transfer is proper). Other courts that
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J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b), characterizing it as an attempt to "broaden
the transferee court's authority to act." 31 As was foreshadowed
by Judge Kozinski's dissent, the Supreme Court recognized that
self-transfer was a "longstanding practice under the statute" yet
provision. 32
rendered it invalid because of the statutory remand
Moreover, the Court invalidated J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) holding that
the statutory mandate could not be compromised by the
J.P.M.L's rulemaking authority. 3 In addition, Judge Kozinski
had observed that nearly 30 years of congressional silence on the
issue of self-transfer merited little deference since Congress
exercises little oversight in the M.D.L. area. 4 Confirming this
observation, Justice Souter stated that subsequent amendments
to § 1407 demonstrated that "Congress knew how to distinguish
between trial assignments and pretrial proceedings" and
supported the conclusion that the statute does not permit selftransfer.3
Judge Kozinski's dissent in Lexecon undoubtedly focused
attention on self-transfer, which previously had been relatively
inconspicuous." The Court's decision in Lexecon should provide

considered the issue had merely assumed self-transfer authority exists. See, e.g., In
re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor Standards Act Litig., 73 F.3d 528, 532 n.7 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that transferee courts typically resolve cases completely, including
handling the trial, while acknowledging statutory limitations).
3, Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1549.
See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962.
3See id.
31 See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1549 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (contrasting this area
with Congress' "vigorous oversight" of tax laws, where congressional silence could
properly be considered ratification).
S5 See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 963.
36 See Bossert, supra note 22, at Al (characterizing transfer in multi-district
litigation as a "little-known legal procedure").
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts maintains M.D.L.
statistics on cases consolidated by the J.P.M.L. for pretrial proceedings, and cases
remanded by the J.P.M.L. to originating districts. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,

1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 74-77 (Statistics Division 1996). Consolidated cases
may be terminated in the transferee district by a variety of methods, some of which
do not involve consolidated trials. Thus, not all cases which are not remanded to the
originating district were necessarily subject to self-transfer and trial in the
transferee district.
Self-transfer has generated commentary throughout its history. In particular,
shortly after Pfizer was decided, commentators called for Congress to authorize the
practice. See Cooney, supra note 23, at 611; Note, supra note 23, at 1036-39. After In
re Korean Air Crash, commentators again began to lament the court's inattention to
the choice of law question in the context of M.D.L. self-transfer. See Richard L.
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the impetus for congressional reform of § 1407 because now that
the Supreme Court has invalidated self-transfer, if Congress
does not amend § 1407 to permit consolidation for trial, federal
courts may be left without a viable alternative to reducing the
burden of M.D.L. cases.
Part I of this Comment discusses the evolution of selftransfer. It analyzes the legislative history of § 1407 and details
cases that had advanced the self-transfer power of transferee
judges, ultimately focusing on the Lexecon case.
Part II
examines the Supreme Court's decision in a three-part attack on
the judicial practice of self-transfer: (1) whether the practice of
self-transfer was a proper use of § 1404(a); (2) whether J.P.M.L.
Rule 14(b) was a valid exercise of rulemaking power; and (3)
whether nearly 30 years of congressional silence should have
been considered as legislative ratification of self-transfer. Part
III posits the argument that the Supreme Court should have
issued a prospective ruling because self-transfer did not deprive
litigants of substantive rights and because a retroactive ban may
have a potentially disruptive impact upon courts burdened with
pending M.D.L. cases. Additionally, Part III part proposes
congressional reform of § 1407, which would allow the J.P.M.L.
to consolidate cases for trial.
I.
A.

EVOLUTION OF SELF-TRANSFER

Legislative History off 1407
The legislative history of § 1407 is unequivocal.3 7

In

Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial
System, 93 YALE L.J. 677 (1984); Robert A. Ragazzo, Transfer and Choice of Federal
Law: The Appellate Model, 93 MICH. L. REV. 703 (1995).
37 The Judicial Conference established the Coordinating Committee for Multiple
Litigation ("Committee") and charged it with supervising nationwide discovery
proceedings in the electrical equipment antitrust civil actions. See H.R. REP. No. 901130, at 2, reprinted in, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1898, 1899. The Committee
marshaled the cooperation of the judges and parties involved in the litigation to
conduct joint pretrial proceedings. See id. The effort was successful in minimizing
the potentially disruptive impact the litigation may have had upon the federal
courts. See id. Following its supervision of voluntary consolidated discovery
proceedings, the Committee drafted § 1407 to provide a statutory foundation for
pretrial consolidation and coordination. See id. "The experience of the Coordinating
Committee was limited to pretrial matters, and the committee consequently
considers it desirable to keep this legislative proposal within the confines of that
experience." Id. at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1901 (1968).
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propounding the statute, the Conference carefully balanced the
competing objectives of efficient judicial administration and
protecting the parties' forum privilege. The House Report on
proposed § 1407 stated that subsection (a) authorized transfer of
civil actions only upon a determination that the transfer served
the "convenience of [the] parties and witnesses" and promoted
the "just and efficient conduct" of judicial administration. 8
Moreover, subsection (a) "requires that transferred cases be
remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated
pretrial proceedings." 39

The lawmakers supported the logic of

this remand mandate with policy statements reflecting the
desirability of local trials: "[Tirial in the originating district is
generally preferable... [for] parties and witnesses, and... it
may be impracticable to have all cases in mass litigation tried in
one district. Additionally,... there will be a need for local
discovery... and... remand to the originating district for this
purpose will be desirable."4 °
The Committee evaluated the existing venue statutes, particularly § 1404,
before proposing the enactment of § 1407. See Co-Ordinating Committee on Multiple
Litigation, Comment on Proposed § 1407 Multi-District Litigation Recommending
New § 1407, Title 28, reprintedin In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 298 F. Supp. 483,
500 (J.P.M.L. 1968). The Committee concluded that existing venue statutes were
insufficient to achieve transfer and consolidation for pretrial proceedings only; this
objective could only be achieved by the "limited and specific statute" that it
proposed. Id. at 498. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 1407, see
generally Rhodes, supra note 2, at 735-36.
38See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1901. The
Committee contemplated that § 1407 would be invoked in extraordinary
circumstances, when significant judicial efficiency benefits could be expected to
accrue. "It is expected that such transfer is to be ordered only where significant
economy and efficiency in judicial administration may be obtained." Id. at 3,
reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1900.
39Id at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1901; see also In re Liquid Carbonic
Truck Drivers Chem. Poisoning Litig., 423 F. Supp. 937, 939 (J.P.M.L. 1976)
(holding that § 1407 authorizes transfer for pretrial proceedings only and not
consolidation for purposes of trial); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1406
(J.P.M.L. 1969) (stating that a transferee judge is free to determine that certain of
the transferred cases are ready for trial and can remand after common discovery is
completed).
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1901-02; see
also In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Intl Airport on June 24, 1975, 479
F. Supp. 1118, 1123 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (remanding cases to transferor court for trial
on the issue of damages in consideration of the convenience of parties and witnesses
and the interest of justice; and finding that there was no commonality of facts or
considerations that would tie the cases together). But see In re Career Academy
Anti-trust Litig., 57 F.R.D. 569, 571 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that where return of
the four cases to their respective districts would result in four identical class action
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The House Report also describes, in lengthy detail, the sort
of pretrial proceedings which were within the scope of authority
conferred upon the transferee judge:
These generally involve deposition and discovery, and, of
course, are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See, e.g., rule 16 and rules 26-37. Under the
Federal rules the transferee district court would have

authority to render summary judgment, to control and
limit pretrial proceedings, and to impose sanctions for
failure to make discovery or comply with pretrial orders. 41
The Conference did not intend for transferee judges to
conduct trials. Trial procedural rules only begin at Federal Rule
38,42 and were thus not contemplated, in the express authority
granted to the transferee judge. Therefore, the Conference
intended that transferee judges only have the authority to
oversee pre-trial proceedings.
References to other venue statutes, specifically § 1404(a),
were recorded in the House Report. The proponents of § 1407

envisioned "28 U.S.C. 1404, providing for changes of venue
generally... [would still be] available in those instances where
transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable.',

3

This

suits, remand would be unnecessary).
4'H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1900; see also
In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 62 F.R.D. 341, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(determining that pretrial proceedings do not include the transferee court
consolidating a case with another case pending in another district), affd sub nom.
Shulman v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975); Control Data Corp.
v. Intl Bus. Mach. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839, 852 (D. Minn. 1969) (finding that
pretrial proceedings include determining important questions of law), afftd sub nom.
Data Processing Fin. & Gen. Corp. v. Int'l. Bus. Mach. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.
1970); In re Air Crash at Schenley Golf Course, Pittsburgh, Pa., on August 21, 1977,
509 F. Supp. 252, 254 (J.P.M.L. 1979) (suggesting that § 1407 pretrial proceedings
include proceedings that are unique to particular parties, claims, or actions); In re
San Juan P.R. Air Crash Disaster, 316 F. Supp. 981, 982 (J.P.M.L. 1970) (stating
that pretrial proceedings are not limited to discovery of liability only and could also
encompass damages); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. at 498 (stating
that pretrial proceedings within the meaning of § 1407 include all judicial
proceedings before trial, including pretrial determination of class questions).
42 Compare FED. R. CIV.P. 38 (Jury Trial of Right), with FED. R. CIV.
P. 16
(Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling;, Management) and FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37
(Depositions and Discovery).
H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1902; see, e.g.,
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago Ill., on May 25, 1979, 476 F. Supp. 445, 450
(J.P.M.L. 1979) (holding that a § 1407 transferee court retains authority under §
1404(a) to transfer case to any appropriate district for all purposes), affd, 644 F.2d
633 (7th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
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affirmative award of § 1404(a) power does not extend to the
transferee judges, whose powers are delineated above. Section
1404(a) power applies only to transferor judges. The drafters
expressly conferred § 1404(a) power to transferor judges who
otherwise may have thought they were stripped of discretion to
transfer cases originally filed within their district, once those
cases were under consideration for M.D.L. consolidation, or once
they were remanded
following
consolidated
pretrial
proceedings."
Perhaps of greatest weight in discerning Congress' intent
when enacting § 1407 is the statement in the House Report that
"future experience... [may justify extending the statute] to
include consolidation and coordination for trial purposes as well"
and should that be the case, "only minor amendments to the
present language of the bill will be necessary."40 After enacting
§ 1407, Congress amended the statute to allow the J.P.M.L. to
consolidate and transfer cases for both pretrial proceedings and
for trial when brought under specific provisions of antitrust
laws.46 More recently, the House approved a bill that would have
provided authority for limited self-transfer; however, this was
not enacted into law.47 Therefore, the present state of § 1407
"See Rhodes, supra note 2, at 723. The interaction between §§ 1404(a) and
1407(a) was the subject of discussion in the J.P.M.L's earliest rulings. See id. at 728.
For example, the J.P.M.L. refused to postpone ruling on consolidating cases arising
out of a single air crash until after the transferor judge had decided a § 1404(a)
motion to transfer the cases for all purposes. See In re Mid-Air Collision Near
Hendersonville, N.C. on July 19, 1967, 297 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (J.P.M.L. 1969)
(stating the transferor judge could consider the § 1404(a) motion again at the
conclusion of consolidated pretrial proceedings). Likewise, the J.P.M.L. instructed
the transferor court to consider transferring cases pursuant to § 1404(a) "when
pretrial proceedings are complete." In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1404
(J.P.M.L. 1969).
4" H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
at 1902.
46 In 1976 Congress added § 1407(h) expressly granting the J.P.M.L.
authority
to "consolidate and transfer ... for both pretrial purposes and for trial, any action
brought under ... [parens patriae authority of] the Clayton Act." Act of Sept. 30,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tit. III, § 303, 90 Stat. 1383, 1396 (1976) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1407(h) (1994)).
17In 1983, Representative Kastenmeier introduced a bill that
would have
granted authority to the J.P.M.L. to transfer multidistrict cases for pretrial
purposes and for trial on liability. See H.R. 4159, 98th Cong. (1983). The bill
presumably died in the Judiciary Committee. See Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen
Woods Kolodgy, Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex
Problem, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 467, 540 n.517 (1985). The proposed bill essentially
codified in In re Air Crash DisasterNear Hanover, N.H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F.
Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971).
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does not contemplate consolidation for trial purposes.
B.

Case Law Development
While the drafters of § 1407 devised a strategy that carefully

balanced the competing goals of streamlining judicial48
administration and preserving plaintiffs choice of forum,
transferee courts have routinely used the statute in combination
with § 1404(a) to achieve trial in the transferee court.49 Since
trial in the transferee court was not contemplated by the
proponents of § 1407, decisions regarding the circumstances
under which judicial efficiency should override plaintiffs forum
choice and which forum's law governs the transferred cases have
been rendered on an ad hoc basis, rather than by careful
congressional formulation.
1.

Origins of Self-Transfer
Beginning as early as 1971, judges have relied upon their
own ingenuity" rather than the statutory mandate of § 1407(a)
to administer
complex multidistrict cases.5
M.D.L.
jurisprudence has, in large part, been characterized by efficient
judicial administration.
In In re Air Crash Disaster Near
Hanover,New Hampshire on Oct. 25, 1968"2 the transferee judge
consolidated cases for trial on the issue of liability alone,
remanding the cases for individual trials on damages. 3 While

48 See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1900.

Even cases that interpreted § 1407 broadly to authorize self-transfer, or transfer to
some court other than the transferor court, still acknowledged that the subsequent
transfer for trial purposes was limited by § 1404(a) which only allows transfer "to
any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1994). See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1971); In re
Caesars Palace Secs. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
49 See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176-78
(D.C. Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989);
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 447 F.2d. 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,
N.H. on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 909 (D.N.H. 1971); In re CBS Color Tube
Patent Litig., 342 F. Supp. 1403, 1404-5 (J.P.M.L. 1972).
50 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 342 F. Supp. at 910 (noting
"the administration of justice can be advanced by an intelligent and imaginative
judge").
See id. at 909.
52 342 F. Supp. 907 (D.N.H. 1971).
See id. at 910.
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conceding that his actions lacked statutory foundation," the
transferee judge concluded that a consolidated trial under his
supervision maximized judicial efficiency,5 and to do otherwise
would constitute "an abdication of [his] responsibility."5 6
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord,57 the leading case on self-transfer, the
Second Circuit held that a transferee judge had the power to
In Pfizer, the transferee judge
permit self-transfer. 5
consolidated cases for trial on both liability and damages, citing
his familiarity with the proceedings.59 Pfizer involved the
interaction of three federal procedural statutes, 28 U.S.C.
§§§ 292, 1404(a), and 1407(a). The Second Circuit had to decide
whether a judge sitting by designation pursuant to § 292, had
the power to rule on a § 1404(a) motion in cases consolidated
under § 1407(a) for pretrial proceedings. The panel, which
included Justice Thomas Clark, a retired Supreme Court justice
sitting by designation, ruled that a district judge sitting by
designation pursuant to § 292, " 'shall have all the powers of a
judge of the court... to which he is designated and assigned' "
and concluded that those powers included ordering a § 1404(a)
transfer of cases consolidated under § 1407.60 Satisfied that its
conclusion "comport[ed] with the esential [sic] purpose of § 1407
to 'promote the just and efficient conduct' of complex
multidistrict litigation,"6 ' the Pfizer court tipped the balance in
favor of judicial efficiency at the expense of the plaintiffs choice
54 See id at 909 ("I must recognize candidly that there is nothing in the language
of 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) or § 1404(a) which directly allows, or even suggests, that the
transferee judge has the power to transfer cases to his district, or any district, for
purposes of trial.").
See id. at 908.

56 Id.

57 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971).

8Id. at 125.
r9 See id. In Pfizer, the transferee judge, Miles W. Lord, was sitting by
designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 in the Southern District of New York, while
permanently assigned to the District of Minnesota. Id. at 123. Pursuant to § 1407,
antibiotic antitrust civil actions were consolidated and transferred to him for
consolidated pretrial proceedings. See id. Upon completion of consolidated
proceedings, Judge Lord invoked § 1404(a) to transfer the "non-settling cases" to the
District of Minnesota for trial, where upon transfer he would be the trial judge. See
id. at 124; see also Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In re CBS Color
Tube Patent Litig.), 342 F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (holding that
consideration of a § 1404(a) motion is "within the discretion of the transferee
judge").
Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 124 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 292).
61 Id. at 125 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)).
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of forum. Moreover, in In re Fine PaperAntitrust Litigation,62
the Third Circuit held that judicial efficiency "outweighed"

plaintiffs' forum privilege, and affirmed a self-transfer without
quantifying any of its benefits other than the transferee judge's
familiarity with the case.' Furthermore, the Third Circuit never
even examined self-transfer as a possible violation of § 1407(a).
The choice of law question has presented particular
difficulty in the M.D.L. self-transfer context. In In re Korean Air
Lines Disasterof Sept. 1, 1983,' the D.C. Circuit had to decide
whether the law of the transferor court applied in claims
transferred between two federal courts.6 The court determined
that it was unnecessary to retain the law of the plaintiffs chosen

forum when a unified system interpreted federal law.65 Thus,
there was "no compelling reason [for the court] to allow [the]

plaintiff to capture the most favorable interpretation of [federal]
law."87 Consequently, the court concluded that transferee circuit
law attended cases transferred pursuant to § 1407(a).6 The D.C.
0 685 F.2d 810 (3d Cir. 1982).
' Id. at 820 The court of appeals concluded that the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it ordered a § 1404(a) transfer without "expressly quantify[ing]
the interest in plaintiffs' convenience." Id. at 819-20. The plaintiffs, however, did not
dispute the transferee judge's power to rule on § 1404(a) motions. Rather they
petitioned the court to transfer the cases to the Northern District of California,
contending that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (the transferee district) would
have been improper as to some of the defendants at the time the actions were
brought. See id. at 818. This argument failed as the court properly noted that those
defendants had settled and were no longer parties to the case at the time of the §
1404(a) transfer. See id. at 819.
64 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), affd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd.
490 U.S. 122 (1989).
See id. at 1174.
66See id. at 1175.
67id.

"' See id. at 1175-76. In In re Korean Air Lines, the choice of law question arose
in the context of a summary judgment motion which was denied by the District
Court for the District of Columbia based upon that court's interpretation of the
applicable federal law. Id. at 1172. Plaintiffs contended that the Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement,
should attend to the cases that originated in the Southern and Eastern Districts of
New York. See id. The court of appeals in the transferee circuit held that the
transferee court was not bound by the interpretation of the transferor district. See
id. The text of the court's opinion twice stated that § 1407(a) effected a transfer for
pretrial purposes only. See id. at 1174, 1176. The court presumably was aware of
self-transfer. In fact, the court's opinion reflected reality when it stated "most cases
transferred under § 1407 are not remanded." Id. at 1176 n.9. Additionally, the
concurrence made express reference to this practice. See id. at 1178 (D.H. Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
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Circuit rejected contentions that transferor circuit law should
apply, reasoning that since § 1407 transfers are for pretrial
purposes only, the transferee court should be "'free to decide a
federal claim ...without deferring to the interpretation of the
transferor circuit.' ,69 Acknowledging the complexity of the
inquiry, the D.C. Circuit urged congressional attention to the
issue. 0
The Demise of Self-Transfer: Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Despite urging from commentators and courts to the
contrary, Congress left transferee courts free to innovate
procedural practices7 1 and invoke self-transfer in cases where the
2.

A transferee court's power to dispose of a case by summary judgment was
expressly contemplated by Congress. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 3 (1968),
reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900. This power has also been recognized by
the courts. See Kaufman v. Trump's Castle Funding (In re Donald J. Trump Casino
Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig.), 7 F.3d 357, 367 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "§ 1407
empowers transferee courts to enter a dispositive pretrial order terminating a
case"); Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours and Co. (In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab.
Litig.), 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996) ("A transferee court has the authority to
enter dispositive orders terminating cases consolidated under 28 U.S.C. § 1407.").
69In re Korean Air Lines, 829 F.2d at 1174 (alteration in original) (quoting
Marcus, supra note 36, at 721).
70 See id. ("The question before us ...whether ...the law
applicable in the
transferor forum attends the transfer [ I should apply to transferred federal claims
...is a question meriting attention from [h]igher [aluthority. Congress, it appears,
"). For thorough discussions of the choice of law
has not focused on the issue ....
question in multidistrict litigation, see Marcus, supra note 36 and Ragazzo, supra
note 36.
71 Recently, the Fourth Circuit expanded the powers of the
transferee court
even further. See Royster v. Food Lion, Inc. (In re Food Lion, Inc., Fair Labor
Standards Act "Effective Scheduling" Litig.), 73 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 1996). In
litigation involving alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §
201 et. seq., the transferee judge, in Royster, granted summary judgment,
dismissing the claims of half of the plaintiffs. Id. at 531. The judge, however, did not
enter final judgments against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) before
suggesting the dismissed claims be remanded. See id. In what the dissent called an
"unprecedented" move, the court of appeals ordered the J.P.M.L. to reverse their
remand order and retransfer the cases back to the transferee court. Id. at 534. Upon
retransfer, the Fourth Circuit would retain jurisdiction over any appeals. See id. at
533 (Butzner, J., dissenting). The court determined that "permitting the transferor
courts ... to reconsider the transferee court's summary judgment orders will
frustrate the aims of § 1407." Id. at 532. In dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Butzner
contended that the "suggestion of remand was designed to provide a fair
opportunity ... to seek a revision of the pretrial orders in light of evidence that
might be disclosed in further proceedings in the transferor courts." Id. at 534
(Butzner, J., dissenting). Further, he urged a retreat from the sort of judicial
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judicial efficiency gains were not outweighed by inconvenience to
the parties.72 Not until the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon
have transferee courts been thwarted in their drive to push the
limits of self transfer.
Lexecon initiated its complaint against Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach and other class counsel ("Milberg
Weiss") subsequent to, and as a consequence of, the massive
multidistrict securities litigation resulting from the failure of the
Lincoln Savings and Loan ("Lincoln Savings").73 Lexecon had
been named as a defendant in the litigation because, in its
capacity as advocate, it allegedly had submitted false and
misleading reports to federal and state regulators about the
solvency of Lincoln Savings.74 The Lincoln Savings litigation,
consolidated and transferred under § 1407, was supervised by
Judge Richard Bilby of the District of Arizona as M.D.L. 834. By
means of a "resolution," Lexecon was dismissed from the
litigation without prejudice.75
Lexecon filed its complaint in the Northern District of
Illinois in the aftermath of its dismissal from M.D.L. 834.76 The
complaint accused Milberg Weiss of "malicious prosecution,
abuse
of process, tortious
interference,
commercial
activism which had characterized the courts' treatment of § 1407: "The great[est]
danger to our system comes ...from failure to honor the role that Congress
prescribed for the transferee court ...in establishing a system of multidistrict
litigation." Id. at 535.
72 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach
(In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Say. & Loan Sec. Litig.),102 F.3d 1524, 1547 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that neither the convenience of the parties
and witnesses nor the interests of justice were served by the transfer pursuant to §
1404 (a)), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
73See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S.Ct. 956
(1998).
74See id.
7"See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1529. The terms of the resolution included three
basic provisions: (1) Judge Bilby would enter an order dismissing Lexecon from the
Lincoln Savings litigation without prejudice; (2) the parties would execute a
stipulation that dismissed Lexecon with prejudice, but Judge Bilby would refrain
from entering the stipulation as an order unless new claims were lodged against
Lexecon, Inc.; and (3) Lexecon would perform professional services for the plaintiff
class. See id. Subsequently, the third provision was modified and Lexecon, rather
than perform professional services, paid the plaintiff class approximately $700,000,
which represented the approximate fees received by Lexecon from Lincoln Savings
and Loan. See id.
76See id. at 1529. The parties agreed to the resolution on June 22, 1992.
Lexecon paid $700,000 in lieu of performing class services in October 1992 and filed
suit in the Northern District of Illinois on November 25, 1992. See id.
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disparagement and defamation."77 Upon motion by Milberg
Weiss, the J.P.M.L. transferred Lexecon's case to the District of
Arizona, pursuant to § 1407(a), for pretrial consolidation with
the remaining M.D.L. 834 cases.78 There it was assigned to a
new judge, Judge John Roll, because Judge Bilby had recused
himself after filing an order in the M.D.L. 834 record
characterizing Lexecon's allegations against Milberg Weiss as
"markedly at odds" with the conditions under which Lexecon was
dismissed from the case.79
Twice, Lexecon petitioned Judge Roll to remand the case to
Illinois. The first request came after the remaining M.D.L. cases
were resolved and the second when discovery was complete.'
Judge Roll denied both motions and subsequently entered
dispositive rulings on all but one of Lexecon's claims.81 The judge
then granted Milberg Weiss' motion to transfer the case to his
court for trial.8 2 Lexecon's sole remaining defamation claim was
tried in Judge Roll's court where the jury found for the
defendant.'
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming Judge Roll's transfer for
trial, noted that self-transfer often promotes efficiency by
eliminating "[tihe time required for a new judge to become
acquainted with the litigation" and by avoiding the "possibility of
conflicting or duplicative rulings and proceedings."' The court's
conclusion that judicial efficiency favored self-transfer in Lexecon
was erroneous. The nature of the proceedings involved in the
litigation, particularly Judge Bilby's recusal, obviated any

77

Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959.

78See id.

Id. The terms of the resolution dismissing Lexecon from the securities
litigation served two discrete functions with regard to Lexecon's case against
Milberg Weiss: (1) it largely formed the basis of Lexecon's complaint which alleged,
in part, that (a) the dismissal of Lexecon from M.D.L. 834 was an implicit
acknowledgment that the complaint against Lexecon lacked merit, (b) Lexecon's
offer to provide professional services to the class was voluntary, as was its payment
of $700,000, and (c) Lexecon's dismissal from M.D.L. 834 was a termination in
Lexecon's favor; and (2) it swept Lexecon's complaint against the class attorneys
into the consolidated litigation and deposited it back into the District of Arizona. See
Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1529-31. Because Lexecon had been dismissed without
prejudice, the District Court for the District of Arizona retained jurisdiction.
8 See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 959-60.
8' See id.
' See id. at 960.
See id.
Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1532.
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benefit of the judge's familiarity with the case, a theory on which
self-transfer was often justified.' Likewise, the judicial objective
of maintaining consistent rulings8 6 was not achieved in Lexecon
87
because Judge Roll's dispositive rulings were factually specific.
The Supreme Court agreed that Judge Roll's actions were
unlikely to improve judicial efficiency significantly because the

Lexecon litigation "was not 'consolidated' with any other [cases]
for the purpose..,

of litigating identical issues on common

evidence... [and] Judge Bilby's recusal... limited the prospects
for coordination."'
The Ninth Circuit had also relied upon the body of case law

that consistently recognized self-transfer89 and the presumptive
validity of J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) to uphold Judge Roll's selftransfer.' Dissenting, Judge Kozinski charged that the case law
Judge Roll, the transferee judge, was one of three federal judges who knew
about the facts surrounding the case when he denied Lexecon's petition to remand
the case to Illinois. Judge Bilby was obviously well-versed in the Lincoln Savings
litigation, albeit unavailable by recusal. See id. at 1529. Additionally, Judge Zagel of
the Illinois district court had capably supervised the Lexecon litigation from
November 25, 1992, when Lexecon filed its complaint against Milberg Weiss in the
Northern District of Illinois, until June 1993 when the J.P.M.L. transferred the case
to Judge Roll. See Carter G. Phillips et al, Rescuing Multidistrict Litigationfrom
the Altar of Expediency, 1997 BYU L. REV. 821, 839 (1997). Thus, Judge Roll was
not necessarily better positioned to conduct trial as would be a single judge who had
presided over all proceedings and developed an intricate familiarity with the facts,
the issues and the parties involved. Judge Roll had neither entered his dispositive
rulings nor set the case for trial in his court when he denied Lexecons August 5,
1994 remand motion. See id. at 1531, 1550 n.22 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
' See Certified Collateral Corp. v. Allnet Communication Servs., Inc. (In re
Long Distance Telecomm. Litig.), 612 F. Supp. 892, 903 (E.D. Mich. 1985)
(approving the transferee judge's reversal of the transferor judge's ruling to comport
with other pre-consolidation rulings and subsequent decisions of the FCC); In re
Plumbing Fixtures Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 493 (J.P.M.L. 1968) (holding transferee
judges are empowered to make determinations of class action questions to avoid
conflicting judicial actions).
0 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (In re American
Continental/Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig.), 884 F. Supp. 1388 (D.Ariz. 1995),
affd, 102 F.3d 1524 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 956 (1998). The district court
held "[no reasonable jury could find that defendants intentionally ...[acted] to
harm [the] plaintiff." Id. at 1393. "[The sitatements ... are clearly expressions of
opinion ...[and] are not actionable as defamation," commercial disparagement, or
tortious interference. Id. at 1396.
Lexecon, 118 S.Ct. at 961.
9See, e.g., Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1532 (stating that the power of transferee
judges to effect self-transfer has been recognized by every court that has considered
the issue).
"0See id. at 1533 n.7 )"Respect for our brethren, and their longstanding
practice, requires us to presume, absent compelling evidence to the contrary, that
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following the Pfizer decision "reveal[ed] a remarkable lack of
critical attention to this issue"9 and the J.P.M.L.'s rules "cannot
broaden the transferee court's authority to act under section
1404(a)."92 The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent and gave
effect to the mandatory remand provision of § 1407(a), " '[elach
action so transferred shall be remanded,' " without deference to
case law or J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b). 93 The Court dismissed the case
law that approved self-transfer when it reasoned the language of
§ 1407(a) was "impervious to judicial discretion,"' and
invalidated Rule 14(b) by holding that the remand provision
could not be excised from the statute by an "exercise in
rulemaking."95
II. A THREE-PART ATTACK ON SELF-TRANSFER
A.

Was Self-Transfer a Proper Use of § 1404(a) ?

The Supreme Court intimated that transfers pursuant to
change of venue statute § 1404(a) may have been appropriately
decided by transferee judges, but for the statutory remand
provision of § 1407(a).96 The Court's reasoning that a § 1404(a)
the rules promulgated pursuant to [§] 1407(f) are 'not inconsistent with Acts of
Congress.'") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f)).
1 Id. at 1541 (Kozinstd, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1549.

Judge Kozinski also concluded that trial in the transferee district unfairly
inconvenienced the plaintiff. See id. at 1547-48. The inconveniences to the plaintiff
included the increased cost of litigating in Arizona and the inability to litigate in
their chosen forum of Illinois. The costs were greater than they would have been in
Illinois because, as Judge Kozinski noted, two of the four testifying witnesses were
from Illinois, the transferor district, while none resided in Arizona. Additionally,
none of the parties nor their attorneys of record were from Arizona. See id; cf In re
Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 908
(D.N.H. 1971) (justifying the consolidation of a trial for liability cases pursuant to §
1407(a) because of the considerable savings in litigation costs). Moreover, the
inability to litigate in Illinois disadvantaged the plaintiff because the case called for
an application of Illinois common law. See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1547; see also
Lexecon, 884 F. Supp at 1388 (deciding the merits of the defamation case based on
Illinois law).
Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)).
9 id.
95Id. at 963.

See id. at 962 (stating that the statutory requirement that transferee judges
conduct only consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings did not preclude
transferee judges from ruling on § 1404(a) motions; transferee judges were
precluded from ruling on § 1404(a) motions only by the obligatory remand provision
of § 1407(a)).
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motion may properly be decided in the context of consolidated or
coordinated pretrial proceedings fails to recognize the
individualized nature of the § 1404(a) inquiry. Section 1404(a),
which grants district courts discretionary power to "transfer any

civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought" when such transfer is done "[flor the convenience97
of [the] parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of justice,"
codifies the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens" and
accords district courts greater discretion to change venue than
was available at common law.9 9 The objective of a § 1404(a)
inquiry is, however, the same as the common law forum non
conveniens inquiry:' 0 to balance the litigants' private interests
with the competing public interest in an efficient system of
judicial administration.'
9728 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994).

In Judge Kozinski's Lexecon dissent, he posited that self-transfer violated the
plain language of § 1404(a), wherein it states "to any other district". See Lexecon,
102 F.3d at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). This comment does not elaborate on
Judge Kozinski's linguistic analysis of § 1404(a), since § 1404(a) was enacted twenty
years before § 1407(a) at a time when self-transfer could not have envisioned by
Congress. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937 (1948) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (1994)); Act of Apr. 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109
(1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994)). The Supreme Court, having reasoned
that § 1407(a) was a bar to any § 1404(a) motion in the transferee court, did not
address the question of whether § 1404(a) would permit a transferee court only to
transfer a case "to another district." See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 964 n.4.
98 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 Historical and Revision Notes (1994) (stating "[slubsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper");
Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949) (construing the newly-enacted § 1404(a) as
recognizing the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens and concluding that
Congress intended it to apply in cases filed under federal statutes with specific
venue provisions).
"See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). In Norwood, the Court
held that the district court properly transferred personal injury suits, which were
filed under federal law, from the District of Pennsylvania to the Eastern District of
South Carolina pursuant to § 1404(a). See id. at 29-30. The court reasoned that the
statute both codified and revised the doctrine of forum non conveniens because at
common law dismissal of an action was the only remedy when the original forum
was not convenient, whereas the statute provided for the transfer of an action when
the original forum was inconvenient. See id. at 31-32.
'00See id. at 32 (explaining that although Congress intended, when enacting §
1404(a), to broaden the exercise of discretion to grant transfers as compared to the
law offorum non conveniens, the facts to be considered remain the same).
'o' See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 509-10 (1947) (invoking the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss a tort action which
plaintiffs filed in a New York federal district court based solely on diversity of
citizenship when the incident giving rise to the tort occurred in Virginia, all fact
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Factors relevant to the § 1404(a) inquiry include plaintiffs
choice of forum, 1 2 accessibility of proof,0 3 availability of
witnesses, 4 as well as administrative factors of preventing
"congested centers"'0 5 of litigation and imposing jury duty upon a
community not connected to the litigation. ° The forum non
conveniens analysis is "flexible and multifaceted, 1o 7 involves an
"individualized, case-by-case consideration,"'
and should be
invoked to disturb plaintiffs choice of forum only when "the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant." 9

In the M.D.L. context, transferee judges are empowered to

"provide

centralized

management ... of [consolidated or
coordinated] pretrial proceedings,""0 which involves different
considerations than judges invoking § 1404(a) to transfer cases
for all purposes."' Transferee judges achieve the central goal of
§ 1407, "improvements in judicial administration," by
simultaneously managing consolidated pretrial proceedings in
multiple cases, thus avoiding conflicting and duplicative
discovery."'
The primary focus of a forum non conveniens
inquiry is to achieve a balance between the individual litigants'

witnesses resided in Virginia, and Virginia state and federal courts provided an
adequate forum for plaintiff to assert his rights).
0'2
See Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 (emphasizing that a plaintiffs choice of forum is
not to be excluded from consideration under the doctrine offorum non conveniens).
'3 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
'04 See id.
105 Id.

106 See id. at 508-09 ("Jury duty is a burden that ought not be imposed upon the
people of a community which has no relation to the litigation.").
07 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31 (1988) (holding that a

forum-selection clause is a valid consideration in the determination whether to
transfer a case, and that the decision is left up to the court subject to § 1404(a)).
'0"Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964). The Court in Van Dusen
held that 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) does "not... effect a change of law" but effects only a
"change of courtrooms," and the Court emphasized that the law of the transferor
governs the case in a 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) transfer. Id. at 642-43; see also Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 521-23 (1990) (establishing that the Van Dusen rule
applies regardless of which party initiates the § 1404(a) motion).
'o Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
110 H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1899.
"' See In re South Cent. States Bakery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 433 F. Supp.
1127, 1130 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (noting that antitrust cases pending in several district
courts may be consolidated for pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407(a), even after
the denial of a § 1404(a) motion which would have consolidated the pending cases to
one district for all purposes).
1
H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 3, reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 1901.
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convenience and the administration of justice."3 Thus, the
transferee judge may not properly consider a § 1404(a) motion
within the M.D.L. framework because consolidated proceedings
affect multiple cases, whereas the § 1404(a) determination
requires an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of
convenience and fairness.""4 Administrative efficiency, although
a valid factor to be weighed in the forum non conveniens inquiry,
is not dispositive."' Thus, transferee judges who, relying on
their familiarity with the proceedings or the overall efficiency of
a consolidated trial, transferred cases to themselves using
§ 1404(a), derogated the individualized, multifaceted nature of a
§ 1404(a) inquiry into a collective, one-dimensional query."6 The
§ 1404(a) analysis, rather than being a factual examination of
plaintiffs forum choice, parties' convenience, access to proof, and
witness availability," 7 became a perfunctory process with judicial
efficiency as its* sole objective. 118
The Supreme Court
improvidently failed to acknowledge the fundamental difference
between the powers of a transferee judge and the nature of the
§ 1404(a) inquiry when it suggested that transferee judges may
properly consider § 1404(a) motions but for the statutory remand
'"' See Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 35 (1955) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the standard applied in Gulf Oil that the court, when weighing
various factors, should support the plaintiffs forum choice unless it finds the
balance overwhelmingly in the defendant's favor); Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508-09
(stating that the court will consider both the private interests of litigants and the
effects of the choice of forum on the practicality and fairness of the trial when
making its decision); Franklin v. Blaylock, 218 F.Supp. 261, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(holding that the court should adhere to the plaintiffs choice of forum unless the
balance is clearly in the favor of the defendant).
114 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 622 (1963).
"6 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508 (describing various factors that ought to be
considered by courts when making a forum non conveniens decision); Lexecon, Inc.
v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (In re American Continental
Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig.), 102 F.3d 1524, 1564-47 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that although M.D.L. courts are to consider the
interests of the individual parties, they often give the greatest weight to judicial
efficiency), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
16 See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1547 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (emphasizing the
important individual considerations of a § 1404 inquiry).
117See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
"8 See Rhodes, supra note 2, at 741 (emphasizing transferee courts' common
concern with judicial efficiency rather than the convenience of parties); compare
with 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (establishing that the convenience of the parties and
witnesses must be considered in addition to judicial efficiency when making
transfer decisions). See, e.g., Trangsrud, supra note 22, at 809 (1985) (noting that §§
1404 and 1407, "in some cases," result in increased judicial efficiency).
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provision.
The J.P.M.L., when selecting a transferee district for
consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407(a), is not
bound by the venue restriction of § 1404(a) which states that
transfer may be made to any district where the case may have
been brought."9 Thus, in some cases self-transfer may have
deprived litigants of due process 12' and created administrative
inefficiencies by relegating parties to inconvenient fora and
imposing jury duty upon community members who did not have
any direct connection to the litigation. 12' Lexecon illustrated how
a § 1404(a) transfer in the M.D.L. context could inconvenience
the parties and deny a community the opportunity to participate
in the resolution of
a local controversy, without even achieving
122
judicial efficiency.
B. Was J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) a Valid Exercise of Rulemaking
Power?
The Ninth Circuit relied on J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) to uphold

"" See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 3 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1900 (stating the "[e]xisting law is inadequate for... pretrial consolidation, since
under 28 U.S.C. [§] 1404(a) transfer is restricted to a district where the action
'might have been brought.' "); see also id. at 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
1901 (stating that "a number of factors should be weighed in the selection of a
transferee district: the state of its docket, the availability of counsel, sufficient
courtroom facilities, etc.").
Some commentators suggest that the J.P.M.L. considers the prospect of selftransfer when selecting transferee districts. See Rhodes, supra note 2, at 740. This
policy favors self-transfer by minimizing the risk that parties will be in districts
where the action could not have been brought. Moreover, it may impair the
J.P.M.L.'s ability to select the district best suited to manage the consolidated
proceedings by implicitly imposing an additional venue requirement. See id.
120 See International Shoe Co. v. Office of Unemployment Compensation
and
Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that, in order to establish in personam
jurisdiction over a defendant, he must have "certain minimum contacts ... such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice'") (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (guaranteeing citizens "due process of law"); Milliken,
311 U.S. at 463 (establishing the factor of "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice").
121 See, e.g., Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1547 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating
that the
transfer to Arizona for trial was not justified by judicial efficiency nor was it proper
for the transferee court to deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to litigate in its
home forum where the community may have had an interest in resolving the
particular controversy).
122 See id. at 1547 n.13 (asserting "both plaintiff and the community have an
interest in resolving the controversy at home") (citations omitted).
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the district court's self-transfer in Lexecon."
The Supreme
Court observed that the obligation § 1407(a) imposed on the
J.P.M.L. to remand cases upon completion of consolidated
pretrial proceedings could not be eliminated by the panel's own
rulemaking authority." The rulemaking power of the J.P.M.L.
is circumscribed by 28 U.SC. § 1407(f), which authorized the
panel to "prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not

inconsistent with Acts of Congress and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."" Thus, the J.P.M.L.'s authority to promulgate rules
is analogous to that conferred on the district courts by § 2071 "to
... prescribe rules for the conduct of their business... [which]

shall be consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of practice
and procedure" 2 ' and Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which governs the district courts' rulemaking
practice.'2 7 The rulemaking power of the courts is limited both
by the federal consistency mandate and a requirement that such

power be narrowly exercised.' Since local rules are not subject
to rigorous procedural requirements, 9 they may not change
123 See
124

id. at 1533 n.7.

See Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,

959 (1998).
'2
28 U.S.C. § 1407(f).
126 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a); see Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1549 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83. The rule states,
in relevant part:
Each district court, acting by a majority of its district judges, may after
giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment, make
and amend rules governing its practice. A local rule shall be consistent
with-but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075.
Id. The FRCP were amended effective December 1, 1995 to provide for heightened
scrutiny of local rule-making processes. See Walter W. Heiser, A CriticalReview of
the Local Rules of the Unites States District Court for the Southern District of
California,33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 580 (1996).
Concerned by the proliferation of local court rules, resulting from 28 U.S.C. §
2071 and FRCP 83, the Judicial Conference, as policy-makers for the federal court
system, commissioned the Local Rules Project, in 1986, to review local rules'
conformity with federal law. See id. at 558-59, 580. The report of the Local Rules
Project documented the extensive proliferation of local rules by some district courts
and identified widespread instances of inconsistencies with federal rules or statutes.
See id. at 558-59.
128 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57 Advisory Committee Note (emphasizing that local
rules must comport with federal rules and Congressional laws). The language of
Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 57 is almost identical to that of 28 U.S.C. §1407(f)
and § 2072, stating "(e)ach district court ... may ... make and amend rules
governing its practice. . ." not inconsistent with Congressional acts or federal rules.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1).
129 See FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee's note (stating that local rules are
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federal policies3 ° or introduce procedural innovations. 31
Furthermore, such rules are invalid to the extent that they
violate or extend beyond the purview of federal statutes. 32
Rule 14(b) ordered the J.P.M.L. to remand "(e)ach
transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee
district... unless ordered transferred by the transferee
judge... under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406." 33 First, it issued
a directive to the J.P.M.L. to remand transferred cases. This
directive is consistent with the language and the dual policy
goals of the statute: to achieve the efficiency benefits of
consolidated pretrial proceedings and to preserve trial in the
subject to "modest procedural prerequisites," causing many commentators to
question their validity).
130See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 498 (1933) (finding
local
rules restricting the powers of an assigned judge invalid because they contravened
stated federal policy to "establish a liberal and flexible plan" of assigning circuit
judges to sit in district courts if either the state of the docket or a particular case so
warranted).
131 See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 642, 650 (1960) (finding Rule 32 of the
Admiralty Rules of the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which
authorized the taking of depositions for discovery purposes only, invalid because
procedural developments exceeded the rulemaking authority of the local district
court); see also Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The
Proliferationof Local Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 60-61
(1997) (theorizing that procedural innovations should be submitted to the Judicial
Conference to be debated and adopted by careful formulation rather than being
adopted unilaterally by individual courts). Professor Sisk predicated his theory of
local rulemaking on the language of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP")
47, the language of which is almost identical to § 1407(f) and FRCP 83. FRAP Rule
47 grants courts of appeals the power to "make and amend rules governing its
practice" and states '[a] local rule shall be consistent with-but not duplicative of Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072." FED. R. APP. P.
47(a)(1).
"2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (establishing that local rules must be consistent with
congressional actions); Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645-46 (1987) (holding a
district court rule regarding the admission procedures of non-resident attorneys
invalid because it was inconsistent with Supreme Court rules of practice and
procedure); ManhattanRy. Co., 289 U.S. at 503 (finding local rule interfering with
federal judicial procedure invalid); McKee v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 801 F.2d 1014,
1017 (8th Cir. 1986) (declaring a district court rule that attempted to render an
entered judgment "not final" was invalid because it was inconsistent with the court's
construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
'33 R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 14(b). In 1970, the J.P.M.L. promulgated the current Rule
14(b) from the former Rule 15(d), which stated, "[aictions will be remanded... [to
the transferor district] unless an order has been signed by the designated transferee
judge transferring an action to another district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). Such actions will be remanded by the Panel to the district
designated in the section 1404(a) or section 1406(a) order." R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 15(d),
reprintedin 50 F.R.D. 203, 209 (1970).
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Additionally, the rule condoned the

transferee judge's use of § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) to transfer cases
"to the transferee or other district" for trial. 135 This provision
violated the policy objectives of the statute and overreached the
J.P.M.L. authority to "prescribe rules... [to conduct] its
business" and not that of the transferee judges."' Thus, the rule
was invalid because it was neither consistent with the statute
37
nor a proper exercise of the J.P.M.L.'s rulemaking authority.
C. Did Congress Intend to Ratify Self-Transfer by its Silence?
The Supreme Court recognized that by giving effect to the
statutory remand obligation of § 1407(a), it was reversing almost
30 years of judicial precedent. 3 The Court reasoned that its
obligation was to enforce the explicit statutory language that
Congress enacted and not defer to erroneous precedent." 9 In this
instance, judicial precedent was not persuasive, even in light of
congressional silence, because Congress had not reenacted the
language of § 1407(a) subsequent to the Pfizer decision and,
consequently, the presumption that Congress adopted the
judicial interpretation of the statute did not apply. 4 ' The "bare
'34 See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative
history and policies behind the enactment of § 1407).
135 R. PRoC. J.P.M.L. 14(b).

28 U.S.C. § 1407(f) (emphasis added).
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 118 S. Ct. 956,
959 (1998).
The J.P.M.L.'s interpretation of § 1407, as evidenced by its promulgation of
Rule 14(b), was not compelling. The J.P.M.L. first passed the predecessor to Rule
14(b) two years after Congress enacted § 1407; the rule was later amended to
comport with the Second Circuit's decision in Pfizer. See Rhodes, supra note 2, at
729-31. It is the " 'contemporaneous construction of a statute' " by those charged
with its implementation which is "entitled to great weight." See United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940) (quoting Norwegian Nitrogen
Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933)) (citing Fawcus Mach. Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931)). Since J.P.M.L. Rule 14(b) was not the
paners contemporaneous construction of § 1407, it was not entitled to great
deference. In American Trucking, the Court accorded great weight to the Interstate
Commerce Commission's ("ICC") construction of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. The
ICC's construction of the statute was contemporaneous with its enactment. See
American Trucking, 310 U.S. at 549. Moreover, the ICC sought to restrict, not
expand, its jurisdiction under the statute. See id. By contrast, the J.P.M.L. sought to
expand the reach of the M.D.L. statute when it enacted Rule 14(b).
'38
See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962.
1n See id.
14 See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (stating that since Congress had not reenacted § 10(b) of
"'

'37 See
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force" of congressional silence was not persuasive,'
where
Congress enacted precise statutory language.1 Also unavailing
was the sheer duration of the practice because "[a]ge is no
antidote to clear inconsistency with a statute."
As the Lexecon Court pointed out, Congress added § 1407(h)
to the M.D.L. statute, expressly granting the J.P.M.L. authority
to "consolidate and transfer.., for both pretrial purposes and for
trial, any action brought under section 4C of the Clayton Act."'
While Congress neither ratified nor repudiated Pfizer or J.P.M.L.
Rule 14(b), the then-settled principle of law,145 § 1407(h)

demonstrated Congress' ability to permit trial consolidation
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the reenactment doctrine did not apply);
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-22 (1940) (holding the reenactment doctrine
has no relevance to the Court's decision since Congress has not reenacted § 302 of
the tax code). But see Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (invoking
the reenactment doctrine to conclude that the judicial interpretation of the
predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1500 limiting court of claims jurisdiction was, in fact,
adopted by Congress when the statute was reenacted).
141 See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120-21 (1994) (invalidating 38 C.F.R. §
3.358(c)(3), which imposed a fault requirement on a VA medical facility in order for
veterans to qualify for benefits, because the regulation violated the controlling
statute, 38 U.S.C. § 1151). The Court rejected 60 years of consistent judicial
interpretation and congressional silence in connection with this issue. See id. at 122;
see also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-78 (rejecting 30 years of judicial precedent
that held § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created a private cause of
action for aiding and abetting liability because congressional silence did not equal
acquiescence); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 782-83 (1985)
(seeking express affirmation that Congress knew of the judicial interpretation of 5
U.S.C. § 8347(c) concerning administrative review of federal disability retirement
programs, rather than relying on the "bare force" of congressional silence, before
holding Congress adopted the judicial interpretation).
12 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (stating
"[clongressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute" while upholding
prior judicial interpretation of § 1981); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (urging the assumption that congressional
silence validates judicial construction of a statute be "put to rest" since the enacted
statutory language should provide the answer to the inquiry).
1 Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 962 (quoting Brown, 513 U.S. at 122); see also Central
Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-78 (rejecting 30 years ofjudicial precedent).
'4428 U.S.C. § 1407(h). Section 4C of The Clayton Act authorizes state attorneys
general to bring civil actions in the name of the state for antitrust violations. See
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4C, 90
Stat. 1383, 1394 (1976).
145 See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 402
(7th Cir. 1974)
(rehearing en banc) (allowing a § 1404(a) transfer by a judge authorized to supervise
pretrial discovery pursuant to § 1407(a)); In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover,
N.H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D.N.H. 1971) (stating that a
transferee judge supervising pre-trial discovery may self-transfer the cases and
consolidate them in the interest of time).
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when it saw fit.14 6 In 1983, a bill was introduced in the House

that would have provided statutory authority for limited selftransfer, however, it presumably died in committee." Congress'
failure to validate or vitiate Pfizer when presented with two
opportunities to do so could engender conflicting inferences
regarding congressional intent; however, given the exacting
statutory language, Congress' inaction supports Judge Kozinski's
contention that Congress exercises little oversight in the M.D.L.
area, 48 rather than the opposite conclusion that Congress
assumed the statutory validity of self-transfer.

III. SETTING A TIMETABLE FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM OF
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION

A.

Lost Opportunity:A ProspectiveRuling in Lexecon

The Supreme Court did not consider the argument that the
Court should ban self-transfer on a prospective basis because it
stated that the argument had not been properly preserved by
Milberg Weiss.'
A prospective ruling in Lexecon would have
been a courageous decision by the Supreme Court and may have
set a timetable for Congress to amend § 1407 to permit
consolidation for trial. Congress originally enacted § 1407 to
respond to the Judicial Conference's concerns that the discovery
demands of massive litigation would overwhelm federal courts.''
146See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 963. ("[Ihe fact that the later section distinguishes
trial assignments from pretrial proceedings generally is... confirmation for our
conclusion.., that the subjects of pretrial proceedings... do not include selfassignment orders.").
147See supra note 47 and accompanying
text.
148 See Lexecon, 102 F.3d at 1549 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
149See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (stating" 'several equally tenable inferences may be drawn
from [congressional] inaction, including the inference that the existing legislation
already incorporated the offered change'") (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
15o See Lexecon, 118 S. Ct. at 966 n.5.
See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 2 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1899.
Following the successful Government prosecution of electrical equipment
manufacturers for antitrust law violations civil actions were filed in 33 federal
district courts. Unless coordinated action was undertaken it was feared that
conflicting pretrial discovery demands for documents and witnesses would disrupt
the functions of the federal courts. See supra notes 2-12, 37-47 and accompanying
text.
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Federal district courts innovated self-transfer on the same policy
grounds that motivated Congress: efficient administration of
justice will be threatened without the power to consolidate
actions. 152 The district courts, however, acted without statutory
authority. If, as the Court has suggested, it concurs that a policy
of judicial efficiency has merit, 5 3 then the Court may well have
exercised its discretion to issue a prospective ruling, in order to
facilitate an orderly resolution of M.D.L. cases already
consolidated for trial, and urge congressional reform of § 1407.
Even before Lexecon, the Court had already given notice that
a policy of judicial efficiency, however desirable, would not
override a statutory mandate.'"
Thus, the Court's decision
proscribing self-transfer as violative of § 1407(a) may have been
expected. Not all decisions of the Court, however, are given
retroactive effect.'5 5
Had the prospectivity argument been
properly preserved, the Court would have had discretion to
See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N. H., on Oct. 25, 1968, 342 F.
Supp. at 908 (stating that to remand cases to the transferor districts "would
constitute, in this era of congested calendars and long delays of trials, an affront to
the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.").
'53 See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997). In
Amchem, the Court arguably conceded that a comprehensive system to compensate
toxic tort victims was a desirable alternative to litigation.
' See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1989). In Finley, the Court
rejected pendent-party jurisdiction where plaintiff asserted a claim against the
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") under the Federal Tort Claims Act
"(FTCA"), and non-diverse state defendants. See id. at 546, 555-56. While the FTCA
mandates that actions against the government be brought in federal court, there
was no federal jurisdiction as to the state defendants. See id. Hence, the claim
against the non-diverse defendants had to be litigated in a separate state court
proceeding. See id. While acknowledging the "efficiency and convenience of a
consolidated action," the Court deferred to Congress' authority to enlarge the scope
of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 555; see also Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252 (1997)
(refusing to certify a proposed class action settlement because the class-certification
requirements of FRCP 23, common issue predominance and adequacy of
representation, were not met). The Amchem Court observed that it is within
Congress' domain to enact an alternative compensation scheme for toxic tort
victims. See id.
"s See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
87-88 (1982) (issuing a prospective ruling that held the federal bankruptcy court
system violated Article I of the Constitution); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S.
97, 105-09 (1971); George v. Camacho, 119 F.3d 1393, 1396-1401 (9th Cir. 1997); cf
Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 94-99 (1993) (discussing the
history of Supreme Court cases dealing with the issue of whether a ruling should be
retrospective or prospective and adopting the "retroactivity approach"). But see
Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973) (recognizing "a general rule of
retrospective effect for the constitutional decisions of this Court.").
12
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prospectively ban self-transfer. 5 '
The Court's prospectivity
analysis affords litigants the opportunity to know what rule of
law governs their actions and avoid perpetrating inequities. 157 In
Chevron Oil Company v. Huson'58 the Court set forth the
following three-part test to determine when a decision shall
apply prospectively only: (1) if the decision announces a new rule

of law; (2) if prospective application would not render the rule
ineffective; and (3) if159 retroactive application would produce
substantial inequities.
The first Chevron factor favored prospective application in
Lexecon because in holding that self-transfer violated § 1407(a),
the Court overruled clear precedent and consequently announced
a new rule of law.'
The second Chevron factor also favored
prospectivity in Lexecon because the new rule would not be

rendered ineffective by prospective application.

Rules of law

which deprive litigants of substantive rights are rendered
ineffective by prospective application. 6' Self-transfer, as a rule
of law, did not deprive litigants of substantive rights. It may

have relegated some litigants to distant venues in which to
conduct their litigation, 6 2 but it did not preclude them from
asserting their rights altogether. Finally, the third Chevron
factor favored prospectivity in Lexecon because retroactive
application may disrupt pending M.D.L. cases already
consolidated for trial and cause substantial inequities for
litigants who have prepared for trial in the respective transferee
1"6When

the Court announces a prospective ruling, it may not apply that ruling

to the case before it. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (stating that, when the Court
applies a rule to the parties before it, that rule must be applied retroactively);
George, 119 F.3d at 1398 (stating that the Supreme Court's decision in Northern
Pipeline, to apply the rule of law prospectively only, meant that the decision was not
to be applied to the parties before it).
157 See George, 119 F.3d at 1396.
155 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
'
Id. at 106-07; see Harper,509 U.S. at 113-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160 See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106 (defining a new rule of law as that which
overrules clear past precedent or decides an issue of first impression whose outcome
could not be clearly foreseen); George, 119 F.3d at 1398 (announcing rule of law shall
apply prospectively when the new rule corrects an error in judicial interpretation).
161 See Harper, 509 U.S. at 86; Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S.
803 (1981) (applying retroactively a law which deprived federal employees of
benefits provided to state employees).
'62 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach (In re American
Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig.), 102 F.3d 1524, 1547 (9th Cir.
1996) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 956 (1998).
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forum.16 3 Accordingly, prospective application would not have
propagated a substantive injustice, and the retroactive ban may
result in multiple new trials, contravening the central objective
of § 1407 - judicial efficiency. A ruling that prohibited any new
self-transfers while permitting district courts to conclude
litigation already consolidated for trial would have afforded
litigants essential fairness and predictability and preserved the
efficiency of judicial administration. Moreover, a prospective
ruling may have acted as an impetus to Congress to reform the
M.D.L. statute to permit consolidation for trial.
B. Future Opportunity: CongressionalReform of § 1407
Experience has justified extending § 1407 to provide for
consolidation for pretrial proceedings and for trial."M Transferee
judges recognized the statute's potential for streamlined judicial
administration when they began transferring cases to
themselves for trial, at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings.
The problem encountered in self-transfer, however, was that it
relied upon a venue statute never designed for such a purpose
and allowed a single judge too much discretion. It is only
through congressional review and reform of § 1407 that
consolidation for trial should be achieved. 16
Section 1407 should be amended to authorize the J.P.M.L. to
consolidate and transfer actions for both pretrial proceedings as
well as for trial. The amended statute should provide that civil
actions may be considered for consolidated pretrial proceedings
and for consolidated trial upon motion by any party to the
litigation or upon the J.P.M.L's initiative. 166 The amended
statute should also provide that the J.P.M.L. may consolidate
only portions of civil actions for trial, such as a consolidated trial
16 See Rhodes, supra note 2, at 749.

See H.R. REP. No. 90-1130, at 2 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898,
1899.
16 See Cooney, supra note 23, at 611 (concluding that § 1407 needs to be
amended to provide transferee judges with the authority to consolidate cases for
trial in order to achieve efficient judicial administration in M.D.L.); Note, supra note
23, at 1030-31, 1036-39 (considering that the J.P.M.L. should be permitted to
consolidate cases for trial, suggesting the drafters overestimated the benefits of
local trials); Rhodes, supra note 2, at 731, 735 (proposing Congress amend § 1407 to
empower the J.P.M.L. to consolidate multiple actions for trial).
6 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i) and (ii). The current statute provides that civil
actions may be considered for pretrial consolidation upon motion by either party or
the J.P.M.L.
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on liability only and individual trials on damages after
remand.'67 In all cases, the J.P.M.L. must first consider whether
pretrial consolidation is appropriate by examining the common
issues of fact and the expected gains in efficient judicial
administration. The J.P.M.L. should order pretrial consolidation
upon its determination that such consolidation will advance the
interest of justice and not unduly inconvenience the parties.
1.

Initial Consideration of Trial Consolidation

After a determination that pretrial consolidation is
appropriate, the statute should provide that proceedings to
consolidate the actions for trial may be initiated by: (1) any party
to the litigation or (2) by the J.P.M.L. In all cases, the J.P.M.L.
should consider whether a consolidated trial is practical, given
the type and number of the cases.
(a) Trial Consolidation Upon Motion of a Party
When a party requests that the J.P.M.L. consolidate the
actions for trial, and all other parties consent, the J.P.M.L.
should order the cases transferred and consolidated for trial
upon a determination that the consolidated trial advances the
interest of justice. If, however, one of the parties opposes
consolidation for trial, the parties should be required to submit
briefs to the J.P.M.L. in support of their position on trial
consolidation, and the J.P.M.L. may hear oral arguments at their
discretion. When one of the parties opposes trial consolidation,
the statute should provide that the J.P.M.L. may transfer and
consolidate cases for trial only upon a finding that the transfer
significantly advances the interest of justice and does not
inconvenience the parties or witnesses.
(b) Trial Consolidation Upon Motion by the J.P.M.L.
If none of the parties to the litigation request consolidation
for trial, the J.P.M.L. should be authorized to initiate
proceedings to consolidate the cases for trial and direct the
parties to show cause why the actions should not be consolidated

'67 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Hanover, N.H., 342 F. Supp. 901 (D.N.H.
1971); see also H.R. 4159, 98th Cong. (1983) (proposing consolidation of cases for
trial on the issue of liability only).
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for trial." When consolidation proceedings are initiated by the
J.P.M.L., it should be permitted to consolidate cases for trial only
upon a determination that such consolidation will significantly
advance the interest of justice and will be for the convenience of
the parties and witnesses.
2.

Subsequent Reconsideration of Trial Consolidation

If upon initial review, the J.P.M.L. does not consider
consolidation for trial warranted by the facts, the J.P.M.L.
should be authorized to reconsider such consolidation during and
at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings. The statute should
provide that during pretrial proceedings, any party to the
litigation may request reconsideration of a motion to consolidate
for trial; at the conclusion of pretrial proceedings, any party or
the transferee judge may request reconsideration. The J.P.M.L.
should not be authorized to initiate reconsideration proceedings
because once pretrial proceedings are underway the parties and
the transferee judges have intimate knowledge of the matter and
are better positioned to recommend reconsideration. The final
determination for trial consolidation should always rest with the
J.P.M.L.
(a) Subsequent ReconsiderationUpon Motion by a Party
If reconsideration is requested by a party to the litigation,
the J.P.M.L. should adhere to the same levels of judicial
efficiency and parties' convenience as would be required for
initial consideration. When a party requests that the J.P.M.L.
reconsider consolidating the actions for trial, and all other
parties consent, the J.P.M.L. should order the cases transferred
and consolidated for trial upon a determination that the
consolidated trial advances the interest of justice. If, however,
one of the parties still oppose the consolidation, the parties
should be required to submit briefs to the J.P.M.L. in support of
their position concerning the trial consolidation, and the
J.P.M.L. may then, after discretionary oral arguments, transfer
and consolidate cases for trial only upon a finding that the
'6 J.P.M.L. Rule 11 Show Cause Orders (a) states that "[wihen transfer of
multidistrict litigation is being considered on the initiative of the Panel pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i), an order shall be filed by the Clerk of the Panel directing the
parties to show cause why the action or actions should not be transferred for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." R. PROC. J.P.M.L. 11(a).
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transfer significantly advances the interest of justice and does
not inconvenience the parties or witnesses.
(b) ReconsiderationUpon Motion by the Transferee Judge
If reconsideration is requested by the transferee judge, the
J.P.M.L. should grant consolidation only upon a determination
that such consolidation will significantly advance the interest of
justice and will be for the convenience of both the parties and the
witnesses. When reconsideration is initiated by the transferee
judge, the J.P.M.L. should consolidate cases only upon the same
showing of judicial efficiency vis-a'-vis parties' convenience, as
when initial consideration is initiated by the J.P.M.L.
CONCLUSION
In 1991, one commentator wrote, "the Supreme Court has
not squarely confronted the propriety of the § 1404-§ 1407(a)
combination. A prohibiting decision by the Court would probably
result in expedited congressional action; the impact would be
nationwide."'69 Lexecon is that prohibiting decision, and its
impact will be felt nationwide. Currently, there are consolidated
M.D.L. civil actions pending in nine federal circuits.170 Now that
the Supreme Court has ruled that self-transfer violates
§ 1407(a), Congress should act with a sense of urgency to restore
the judicial efficiency benefits which may be achieved by M.D.L.
trial consolidation. Had the Supreme Court issued a prospective
ruling banning self-transfer, it could have facilitated an orderly
resolution to M.D.L. cases already consolidated for trial, and
urged Congress to enact amendments to § 1407 to permit the
J.P.M.L. to consolidate cases for trial. As it stands, Congress, on
its own initiative, must act quickly to do so.
Noreen Dever Arralde*

"'
'7

Rhodes, supra note 2, at 752 (citation omitted).
See ADMINISTRATiVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL
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(1996).
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